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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
rINCENT CHIODO,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
vs.
BEAR RIYER TELEPHONE

Case No.
10473

COMPANY,
)
Defendant and Appellant.

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE
This is an action for breach of an employment
agreement.

DISPOSITION IN LO\VER COURT
The case was tried to the Court without a jury.
From a decision and judgment for the plaintiff, defendant appeals.
I

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendant seeks reversal of the judgment aud
judgment in its favor as a matter of law, or that failing,
a new trial.
STATE.MENT O:F .FACTS
This action was commenced by Vincent Chiodo
and others against General 'V aterworks Corporation,
a Delaware corporation, Bear River Telephone Company, a Utah corporation, and 2500 shares of stock of
Bear River Telephone Company, a Utah corporation.
Pursuant to a stipulation of the parties this Court on
September 29, 1964, entered its order dismissing the
complaint against General 'Vaterworks Corporation
for lack of jurisdiction. By stipulation of the parties
entered into in open court on April 2, 1964, the service
of process against the 2500 shares of stock of Bear l{iyer
Telephone Company was quashed for lack of in rem
jurisdiction. Therefore, the trial of this matter was
limited to an action between Vincent Chiodo and thr
Bear River Telephone Company for breach of an employment contract. There are no other issues and no
other parties involved in this appeal.
The defendant Bear River Telephone Company is
a Utah corporation which has existed in this state since
1905 (Ex. 37).
The plaintiff Vincent Chiodo first acquired stock
ownership in the Bear River Telephone Company lll
2

!94<3 when he acquired fifty-one per cent of the out-

standing stock ( R. 20) . At the time of the occurrence
of the events out of which this controversy arose, he
11 as its general manager and principal stockholder.
On December 21, 1960, as a result of negotiations
beginning on or about .May 5, 1960, plaintiff sold his
stock in the llear River Telephone Company to General
Waterworks Corporation and on January 18, 1961,
plaintiff entered into the employment agreement here
in question (Ex. 6) with the Bear River Telephone
Company. This agreement provides as follows:
January 3, 1961
Mr. Vincent Chiodo

651 North Third Street East

Tremonton, Utah

Dear .Mr. Chiodo :
Since 1943 you have been active in the operation and management of Uear River Telephone
Company (Bear River) and you presently hold
the offices of Vice President and General Manager in that company.
As you know, Bear River has recently become
a subsidiary of General 'Vaterworks Corporation. This letter is written to confirm our understanding with you concerning your continuing
employment by Bear River and the nature of
your duties.
In accordance with the understanding and
agreement which we h~we arrived at, your employment by Bear River is to contin.ue for a
period of ten years from the date hereof. At the
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end of such ten-year ~eriod your continuing
employment by Bear River shall be considered
by you and by us, and shall be subject to such
agreement as may then be arrived at. Nothing in
this letter agreement, however, shall be held to
preclude your continuing employment by Bear
River after such ten-year period.
Your duties shall be those of manager of Hear
River, which presently operates telephone exchanges in and about the municipalities of Tremonton, Bear River City, Snowville, Fielding,
Thatcher and Garland, Box Elder County,
Utah, and such other duties as may be assigned
to you from time to time. Such duties shall include the management of such other telephone
properties as may be acquired by Bear River
from time to time, either through purchase or expansion, or such other telephone companies in
the Utah area as may become subsidiaries of
our parent company, General Waterworks Corporation. You shall, if so requested and if you
are elected to that office, act as a vice president
of Bear River from time to time. You shall devote your full time to Bear River and to such
other telephone subsidiaries of General 'Vaterworks Corporation.
Your salary for the duties performed by yon
for Bear River during the term of this agreement
shall be $12,000 per year beginning January l,
1961 and payable in semi-monthly installments
of $500 each.
In the event of any substantial increase in our
work load because of the expansion of the Bear
River telephone properties or the acquisition by
General Waterworks Corporation of other telephone properties in the Utah area, the cornpen-
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sation to be paid you shall be increased, the
amount of such increase to be arrived at by mutual agreement between us.
In connection with our retirement and insurance plan for our employees, there has been
issued to you by New England .Mutual Life Insurance Company its .Monthly Retirement Income contract #2,330,952 in the face amount of
$10,000 and which contract provides, among
other things, for certain retirement income payments to you. The annual premium for such contract is $1,520. 'Ve have paid 75% of such premium each year since the contract was issued
and you have paid 25% thereof, which arrangement shall continue. Our obligation to pay any
part of such premiums shall terminate upon (a)
your death, ( b) November 1, 1969, or (c) your
leaving our employment, whichever event shall
first occur.

If the foregoing correctly sets forth the understanding which we have arrived at will you please
so indicate by your acceptance thereof on the
enclosed copy of this letter and return it to me.
BEAR RIVER TELEPHONE
COMPANY
Bv Isl A. W. Sanders
·
Executive Yice President
The foregoing correctly sets
forth my understanding with
you and is agreed to this
18th day of January, 1961.
Is/ Vincent Chiodo

Vincent Chiodo

5

Prior to the acquisition of the stock of Bear River .
Telephone Company by General Waterworks Corpora- !
tion, a series of meetings and negotiations took place
between plaintiff and representatives of General '.y aterworks Corporation relative to the employment contract
which would be entered into by Bear River Telephone
Company after General Waterworks Corporation '
acquired the Bear River Telephone Company stock and
elected directors. The final draft of this agreement and
the one which was actually entered into was furnished
to plaintiff on November 4, 1960 (Exs. 5 and 6).
During the course of negotiations, a meeting was
held on August 3, 1960, in Logan, Utah, between A. W.
Sanders, a representative of General Waterworks Corporation, and Vincent Chiodo. The discussion at this
meeting was recorded by a certified shorthand reporter
(Ex. l) . The trial court concluded that the negotiations
of General Waterworks Corporation relative to the
employment contract including the Logan discussion
were ratified by the Bear River Telephone Company
when it entered into the employment agreement (R.
649).

Pursuant to the written employment agreement
Vincent Chiodo continued in his position as manager
of Bear River Telephone Company from the time
General Waterworks Corporation acquired the stock
of Bear River Telephone Company until December IO.
1963, when he was discharged. Almost from the moment
General 'Vaterworks took over as owner of the cou-

6

trolling interest of Bear River Telephone Company,
i Chiodo evidenced his regret in having sold his control
in the Company (Ex. 22 and Exs. 30-32) . This lingering regret came to a climax late in July of 1961, just
six months later, when Chiodo was informed by representatives of General 'Vaterworks Corporation that
, a trade of the property with .Mountain State Telephone
&Telegraph Company was a possibility and that if consummated, Chiodo was through as manager (R. 40-41).
Although this trade did not come about, Chiodo took
the announcement as a declaration of war and embarked
upon a program of non-cooperation, internal sabotage
and general insubordination to force the Company to
discharge him. Pursuant to this deliberate program,
\'incent Chiodo engaged in various "unorthodox" prac, tices which led to his eventual discharge. Some of these
acts were characterized by the trial court as "moonlight
operations, as we call it, double work contracts and all
kinds of unorthodox employment practices" (R. 592).
Chiodo's tactics successfully culminated in his discharge
effective December 10, 1963 (Ex. 49). A summary of
the grounds for discharge of Vincent Chiodo established
by defendant at the trial is as follows:
Vincent Chiodo falsified payroll records for his
son, Don Chiodo (Ex. 101, 11116/62, R. 407, Ex. 83,
R. 24.J.) and instructed a subordinate employee to prevare other false payroll records for his son, Don Chiodo,
so Don Chiodo could be paid by Bear River Telephone
Company even though he was then working in Montana
forauother employer (R. 249, 411-412, Exs. 83, 101).
_ 1.
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2. Vincent Chiodo permitted and condoned other
payroll practices permitting improper payments to be
made directly and indirectly to members of his family
''
including his 14-year-old granddaughter (R. 199-389·
'
Exs. 50-98, R. 468, 470, Ex. 109).
3. Vincent Chiodo instructed subordinate employees
to engage in improper payroll practices by improperly
reporting their own time in violation of the Federal
Wage and Hour laws (R. 428, 466).
4. Vincent Chiodo actively engaged in a subterfuge
to obtain the stock of Bear River Telephone Company
from its principal shareholder, for an undisclosed principal while he was employed as manager and vice-president of Bear River Telephone Company (R. 130-134,
Ex. 42).
5. Vincent Chiodo wrote letters to the Utah Public

Utilities Commission and the R.E.A. in 'iVashington
concerning the proposed exchange of stock of the Bear
River Telephone Company by the owner of said stock
when he was informed of such proposal on a confidential
basis by his employer and was specifically instructed
to keep this information private (R. 41-42, Exs. 23, 31).
6. Vincent Chiodo wrote letters to his superiors
which were disrespectful and insolent, communicated
this disrespect to his subordinates and instructed his own
subordinate employees not to provide any information
to the main office which was not specifically asked for
(R. 316-324, 326, 393-402, 425-426, 489).

8
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7. Vincent Chiodo instructed his subordinate em-

' ployees not to make proper billings to customers of
Bear River Telephone Company and to prepare the
records in such a way that the home office could not
determine what was being done ( R. 438-445).
8. Vincent Chiodo refused to follow specific direc-

tions from his superiors in the simple matter of the cancellation of an insurance policy on Bear River Telephone Company equipment (R. 570, Exs. 30, 31, 32).
Plaintiff's case was:
(a) That the contract was part of the deal for the
sale of the controlling stock of Bear River Telephone
Company to General Waterworks Corporation and
hence not terminable for any reason;
(b) That plaintiff was a good manager and should
not have been discharged; and

(c) That the grounds shown by defendant did not
constitute good cause.

The trial court ruled against plaintiff on the first
issue, and defendant did not dispute that the telephone
company was profitably operated while Chiodo was
manager. As to the third issue, the trial court concluded ( R. 596-597) :
" ... while the plaintiff's conduct has certainly
not been lilywhite, considering the Sodam and
Gomorrah community that he was working in
at that time, I'm not going to charge him with
such a serious violation in the light of the sur-
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rounding circumstances and surrounding metJi.
ods of operation so as to justify discharge."
After stating fully its conclusions ( R. 588-593),
the trial court adopted over defendant's objection~
(R. 674-677) findings of fact and conclusions of law
stating that the discharge of Chiodo was wrongful and
"without just cause or excuse" and awarded Chiodo a
judgment in the full amount of the contractual salary
for the balance of the ten-year term of the contract plus
certain fringe benefits as allowed by the contract.
It is defendant's contention on this appeal:
I. That the conclusion of the trial court is not sup·

ported by the evidence, and that defendant is entitled
to a judgment, no cause of action as a matter of law.
trial.

2. Failing that, the defendant is entitled to a new

3. Failing that, the judgment should be reduced

by the amount Chiodo could reasonably be expected to
earn during the balance of the ten-year contractual
period, or alternatively that defendant be awarded judg·
ment on its counterclaim for the damages incurred Ly
it in having to replace Chiodo with a loyal manager.
ARGUMENT

I. THE EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT
HERE IN ISSUE MAY BE TERMINATED
FOR CAUSE "\VITHOUT LIABILITY FOR
BREACH OF CONTRACT.

10

The general rule as to employment contracts is
that the relationship is one at the will of either party,
and it may be so terminated. Bullock v. Deseret Dodge
Truck Center, Inc., 11Utah2d l, 354 P.2d 559 (1960).
In the case at bar, the contract between Chiodo and
Bear River Telephone Company was for a term of ten
years. This provision qualifies the Bullock rule to require
the employer to show cause, i.e. a breach of an express
or implied term of the contract by one party to excuse
performance by the other. Defendant contends that it
has clearly established several such breaches of contract
by Chiodo.

Restatement of The Law (Second), Agency
(1958) hereinafter referred to as Restatement, Agency,
states in Section 409:
" ( 1) A principal is privileged to discharge
before the time fixed by the contract of employment an agent who has committed such a violation of duty that his conduct constitutes a material breach of contract or who, without committing a violation of duty, fails to perform or
reasonably appears to be unable to perform a
material part of the promised service, because
of physical or mental disability.

" ( 2) The election by the principal not to discharge the agent for a breach of duty does not
of itself release the agent from liability for loss
caused by the breach nor, if the agent commits
subsequent breaches of duty, is the principal
prevented from electing subsequently to treat
the first breach as cause for discharge."
11

-,
l

In the comments on Subsection (I) of Section 409 ,
Restatement, Agency, it is stated as follows:
"b. What breach justifies dismissal. As stated
in Section ll8, a principal can terminate any
specific authority of an agent at any time, and
can also terminate the relation between them.
He cannot, however, do this rightfully before
the end of the period for which he has agreed
to employ the agent, unless the agent has committed a material breach of contract or has
failed to perform a condition. An unexcused
failure substantially to perform the work which
he has contracted to do, or a serious violation
of the duty of loyalty or of obedience, constitutes
an entire breach of contract. A wilful disobedience or a violation of duty of loyalty may constitute a material breach of contract although
the harm likely to arise from such breach is verv
small. In other matters, the harm arising fro~
the breach is a matter to be considered in determining whether or not the misconduct of the
agent is sufficiently serious to be a cause for
discharge."
Also, Section 399 states:
"A principal whose agent has violated or
threatens to violate his duties has an appropriate
remedy for such violation. Such remedy mar be:

" (J· ) d.1scharge; or ... "
As appears from the Restatement, A,gency. as
above set forth, a contract of employment may be rightfully terminated before the time fixed by the contract
if the agent has violated his duty of loyalty or of

12
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obedience to the employer. This same rule is also summarized in J5 Am. Jur., 1lfaster and Servant, Section
40:

"Generally.-,Vhile if a contract of employment is general in regard to the term of employment the employer may terminate it at will without incurring liability to the employee for the
discharge, where an employee is engaged for a
definite term of employment, the employer, in
order to justify a dismissal of the employee during the agreed term, must be able to show a
breach on the part of the employee of some express or implied provision of the contract of
service. The implied provisions of such a contract
are violated when the servant does something
inconsistent with the relation of master and
servant or incompatible with the due and faithful
performance of his duties. As typical of the
causes or reasons which will justify the dismissal
of an employee before termination of the contract of employment may be mentioned neglect
of duty, negligence, incompetence, or inefficiency; dishonesty; intoxication; disobedience of
the·employer's ;ules, instructions, or orders; insolence or disrespect; unfaithfulness to the employer's interests; immoral, disreputable, and
unbecoming conduct ;-in short, anything which
indicates unfitness for the service for which the
employee was engaged. These general principles
apply with reference to the right to discharge
employees in executive or supervisory capacities
as well as those in subordinate positions, although, perhaps, one holding a supervisory position has more latitude in the performance of his
duties than does a mere clerk or workman; the
extent of his discretion, however, depends upon
the particular circumstances."
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That an employer need not retain an employee who
disobeys the employer's rules, instructions and orders,
who is insolent and disrespectful and is unfaithful to lhe
employer's interests would seem to be axiomatic. However, see, e.g., Polk v. Missouri P.R. Co., 245 S.W. 186
(Ark. 1922); Borg v. International Sisal Co., 4 N.W.
2d 113, 141 A.L.R. 657 (Minn. 1942); Craig v. 1'hompson, 244 S.W. 2d 37 (Mo.); Haag v. Revell, 184 P.2d
442 (Wash.).
The Haag v. Revell case, supra, involved a question
of discharge of an employee for insolence and the court
summarized the law as follows:
"Appellant prays for reversal upon several
grounds. It is urged that the ground of discharge
which the court found valid, was not pleaded.
However, no objection was made to the intro·
duction of the evidence, which tended to establish that ground. If objection had been made,
we think it would have been rightly overruled.
Plaintiff alleged that he was discharged 'without
cause.' The defendant categorically denied that
allegation and, therefore, had the right to introduce evidence that there was a cause. A broad
field was opened by the plaintiff's allegation
that he was discharged without cause. It is said
in 35 Am. Jur. 471, § 37:
" 'It is not necessary that an employer, in
order to justify a dismissal, show that in dismissing his employee he in fact acted upon so~e.
proper ground of dismissal. It is sufficient ~f
a ground of dismissal existed at that time. lt 1~
not material whether the employer knew .of
grounds which in fact existed at the time of dis-
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charge; notwithstanding his ignorance, he may
avail himself thereof, and in the event of his
death, his representative has the same right.
Nor is it material that the employer assigned
another ground as the cause of the employee's
dismissal. The employer may justify a dismissal
by relying on a ground different from that assigned at the time of the dismissal.' (Emphasis
added).
"The trial court, in its memorandum opinion,
relied upon certain sections of the article on Master and Servant in 35 Am . .J" ur., a limited portion
of which we quote:
" 'Unprovoked insolence or disrespect on the
part of the employee toward the employer or the
latter's representative may afford ground for the
discharge or dismissal of the employee prior to
the conclusion of the term of employment.' 35
Am. Jur. 480, § 48.
" 'Even though one's services are engaged by
another for a definite term, the employer may
discharge him for good cause during the term of
the employment without incurring liability for
breach of contract. This is true even where the
contract of employment stipulates that the employee shall be retained in the service during the
term of his life.' 35 Am. J ur. 470, § 36.
"Appellant relies largely upon the case of
v. Abbot, 231 lVIass. 180, 120 N.E.
383. The case of Dorrance v. Hoopes, 122 Md.
344, 90 A. 92, Ann. Cas. 1916A, 1012, is even
closer to the instant case in its facts.
~f clntosh

"The law governing discharge for insolence
is well settled .The real value of the cases just
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cited is that they demonstrate that every case
of this kind must be decided upon its own facts."
II. VINCENT CHIODO WAS AN AGENT
OF BEAR RIVER TELEPHONE COMPANY
BY VIRTUE 011-. THE EMPLOYMENT
AGREEMENT AND THE ACTIONS OF'
VINCENT CHIODO DURING THE COURSE
OF HIS EMPLOYMENT WITH BEAR
RIVER TELEPHONE COMP ANY YVERE
INCONSISTENT WITH THE RELATION
OF PRINCIPAL AND AGENT AND BEAR
RIVER TELEPHONE
COMP ANY HAD
GOOD CAUSE FOR HIS DISCHARGE.
The contract in question (Ex. 6) is set forth,
supra. The trial court determined that this contract was
to be interpreted (contrary to defendant's contention)
by a consideration of all prior negotiations including the
transcript of a conversation held in Logan, Utah, on
August 3, 1960 (Ex. I). Even accepting this ruling,
arguendo, it is still clear that the agreement between
the Bear River Telephone Company and Vincent Chiodo
was one of master and servant. While plaintiff seems
to take the position that he was given broad manage·
ment authority by the discussion in Logan (Ex. I) he
has not alleged nor shown that he was an independent
contractor and not subject to any control by or duty
to the officers and directors of the Bear River Telephone
Company. There is nothing in that transcript to justify
either plaintiff or an impartial reader in concluding
that Chiodo was to run the Bear River Telephone Corn·
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pany as his own master, free from any control by the
representatives of the new owner, all without any duty
of loyalty to his corporate employer and its new corporate stockholder.

The following are specific breaches by Vincent
Chiodo which justify his discharge:
A. Payroll Padding.

Section 387 of the Restatement, Agency, provides
as follows:
"Unless otherwise agreed, an agent is subject
to a duty to his principal to act solely for the
benefit of the principal in all matters connected
with his agency."
In Dixie Glass Co. v. Pollak, 341 S.,V.2d 530,
91 A.L.R.2d 662, 679 (Tex.Cir.App. 1960) the court
said:

"It is true that many cases state the rule broadly to be that whether an act occurred is, if the
evidence is conflicting, a question of fact for the
jury, and, if the jury finds it did occur, the question of whether it constitutes good cause for discharge is a question of law for the court to decide.
However, while the rule is thus broadly stated,
we think no more was intended than that under
the facts of the particular case, the acts of the
employee were such, as a matter of law, as to
bt:> good cause for discharge. These cases, for the
most part, were cases of violation of reasonable
and substantial rules governing the employee in
performance of his work, or aggravated cases of
refusal to obey reasonable orders of the employer
17
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that amounted to insubordination, or, CMes of
clearly dishonest acts toward the emplover 011
the part of the employee in the attempted performance of the employee's work, or acts such
as an unprovoked fight by an employee with rm
officer of the employer in the presence of other
employees. Royal Oak Stave Company v. Grace
Tex Civ App, 113 SW 2d 315, writ dism; Rob'.
ertson v. Panhandle, S. F. Ry. Co., Tex Civ
App, 77 SW2d 1078, writ dism; Matlocl..· v
Gulf, C. & S.F.R. Co., Tex Civ App, 99 S\V2d
1056, writ dism; Swilley v Galveston, H. & S.A.
Ry. Co., Tex Civ App, 96 SW2d 105, writ dism;
Shute & Limont v McVitie, Tex Civ App, 72
SW 433. (Emphasis added).
It is unusual when it is possible by uncontroverted
evidence to prove that payroll records have been falsified
so as to permit improper payments to employees. It
is a fully documented fact in this case, that Vincent
Chiodo himself prepared false payroll records for the
benefit of his son, Don Chiodo, and also directed his
subordinate employee, Maurice Staples, to prepare
other false payroll records for Don Chiodo.

Between November 15, 1962 and November 24,
1962, Don Chiodo was in Montana working for Max
Fonnesbeck (Ex. 83) and was paid for the work there
performed for Bonneville Construction Company (R.
249) . During the precise same period the time sheets
for Don Chiodo as a regular employee of Bear River
Telephone Company (Ex. 101) showed he was working full time at specific company facilities located a
long way from Montana (Ex. 101). It was not dis·
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puted that he was paid his regular salary by the company for that period. One of these time sheets was
tilled in personally by Vincent Chiodo showing his
snn as working at Tremonton and Fielding on Noyember 16, 1962 for a total of eight hours.
"Q And the first daily time sheet, who prepared
that 1 [Ex. 101. 11116/62]

"A I put in the head and Mr. Chiodo filled in
the hours and code.
"Q .Mr. Don Chiodo?

"A Mr. Vincent Chiodo." (R. 406-407).
The others for the period were filled in with false information stating that Don Chiodo was on the job for
Bear River Telephone Company by employee Staples
pursuant to directions from Vincent Chiodo (R. 411412).

"Q Now do you know whether Don Chiodo was
in Tremonton all during the time that those
time tickets cover?

"A No, he wasn't in Tremonton during this
whole period.
"l\iR. RAl\IPTON: You mean he was there
none of the time or was not there all the time?
"A He wasn't there all the time. Some of the
time he was there.
"Q Did you prepare some of those time tickets
or daily time reports yourself?

"A Yes.
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"Q Who instructed you, or were you instructed
to fill these time sheets out?

"A Yes.
"Q Who instructed you that you should fill them
out?

"A Mr. Vincent Chiodo.
"Q What did he say?

"A He just told me the account numbers to
use for these days that Don wasn't here.
"MR. RAMPTON: As to what'?
"A As to the days he wasn't there.
"Q Are the numbers which Mr. Vincent Chiodo
told you to use in recording these time records
the numbers which appear thereon now?

"A Yes."
The time records for Don Chiodo prepared by Max
Fonnesbeck compared with the Bear River Telephone
Company records for the same period prepared by
Vincent Chiodo or by Mr. Staples pursuant to Vincent
Chiodo's instructions show:

Date

11/15/62

Max Fonnesbeck Record
(Ex. 83)

Logan to Great Falls
8 hours

Don Chiodo

Max Fonnesbeck 8 hours

Bear River Telephone Company
Daily Time Report
of Don Chiodo
(Ex. 101)

Repairs to Pole
Lines
Code 3
f Tremonton]
8 hours
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Date

ll Hi/62
1

Max Fonnesbeck Record
(Ex. 83)

Great Falls
Don Chiodo

9 hours

Max Fonnesbeck 9 hours
llil7/62

Great Falls
Don Chiodo
9 hours
Max Fonnesbeck 9 hours
Great Falls
Don Chiodo
9 hours
Max Fonnesbeck 9 hours

11'19/62

Great Falls
Don Chiodo

9 hours

Max Fonnesbeck 9 hours
11 20/62

Great Falls
Don Chiodo

9 hours

Max Fonnesbeck 9 hours
ll '21152

Great Falls
Don Chiodo

9 hours

.Max Fonnesbeck 9 hours
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Bear River Telephone Company
Daily Time Report
of Don Chiodo
<Ex. 101)

Code 903
[Tremonton]
4 hours
Code 905
[Fielding]
4 hours
No time sheet
No time sheet
Code 3
[Tremonton]
4 hours
Code 5
[Fielding]
4 hours
Code 3
[Tremonton]
4 hours
Code 4
[Promontory l
4 hours
Code 3
[Tremonton]
8 hours

Max Fonnesbeck Record

Date

(Ex. 83)

11/22/62

Great Falls
Don Chiodo
9 hours
Max Fonnesbeck 9 hours

II/23/62

Great Falls
Don Chiodo

9 hours

Max Fonnesbeck 9 hours
II/24/62

Great Falls to Logan
Don Chiodo
8 hours
Max Fonnesbeck 8 hours

Bear River Tele.
P!tone Company
Dally Time Report
of Don Chiodo
<Ex. 101)

No time sheet
(Thanksgiving)
Code 4
[Promontory]
8 hours
No time sheet

This documentary evidence indisputably establishes falsification of payroll records for the benefit of
Don Chiodo by Vincent Chiodo personally or pursuant
to his instructions. Although the trial court refused tu
amend the findings of fact prepared by plaintiff's
counsel, it did tacitly determine that this payroll fraud
was engaged in by Vincent Chiodo when it said (R.
592):

" ... but there's always padding in these costplus deals, and when Mr. Chiodo took over this
company he was living in these surroundings, and
these parties must have envisaged moonlight operations, as we call it, double work contracts and
all kinds of unorthodox employment practices."
In addition to the payroll padding and falsification
of payroll records for Don Chiodo, Vincent Chiodo also
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permitted his sons, Don and Gene Chiodo, to receive
monetary benefits for work done by Bear River Telephone Company employees on Bear River Telephone
Company time for work that was ostensibly under
contract to .lVIax Fonnesbeck.
The evidence establishes that Don and Gene Chiodo
were paid the following amounts in connection with
contracts let by Bear River Telephone Company to
Max Fonnesbeck:
Date

7/19/61
912/61
1129/62
1/31162
5/5/62
3/20/62
7 5 1 62
1

8 1 22 02

12122/62

Exhibit
No.

55
96
62
63
75
97
98

Record
Ref.

219
229-230
284
232
232
237-238
284
284
284

Don
Chiodo

$ 300.00
2,000.00

Gene
Chiodo

$
300.00

l,000.00
400.00
3,060.00
165.00
270.00

$3,700.00

$4,795.00

The evidence to support the claim that Don and
Gene Chiodo were obtaining benefits through the use of
Bear River Telephone Company employees on Bear
HiYer Telephone Company time requires a study of the
testimony arnl the exhibits introduced beginning on
page Hl9 of the record and concluding on page 495.
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This evidence shows that Vincent Chiodo's sons
did do some of the work on the contracts in question 011
their own time when they were not being paid directly
by Bear River Telephone Company..Max Fonnesbeck
and another subcontractor of Max Fonnesbeck, Grant
Allred, did perform portions of such contracts on their
own time and by use of their own employees. However,
the record is clear that some employees of the Bear Rirer
Telephone Company were used by Vincent Chiodo's
sons on regular company time to perform work which
Vincent Chiodo's sons had subcontracted on a fixed fee
basis and from which they profited at the expense of
Bear River Telephone Company.
Jerry Jones (R. 362-370), Steve Anderson (R.
353-359), Richard Clark ( R. 346-348), and Da vicl Scott
(R. 335-339) all testified that they had performed work
on regular time and while being paid by Bear River
Telephone Company which work had been identified
by Mr. Allred and Mr. Fonnesbeck as work covered by
contracts let to Fonnesbeck and which Fonnesbeck hnd
subcontracted in part to Don Chiodo or Gene Chiodo
either directly or through Grant Allred. David Scott
( R. 334-335) and Richard Clark ( R. 344-345) both
testified that they saw splicing being done on a Max
Fonnesbeck contract by other Bear River Telephone
Company employees while they were working for Bear
River Telephone Company during regular compauy
working hours.
Steve Anderson testified that he had personall~·
assisted Don Chiodo periodically over a period of three
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or four months on Bear River Telephone Company time
in splicing an installation of telephone cable at Thiokol
(R. 355) and this particular telephone cable was ini stalled under contract by l\Iax Fonnesbeck ( Exs. 57 and
58) which Fonnesbeck had subcontracted to Don Chiodo
(R. 230, 242). Jerry Jones testified that he had personally installed on Bear River Telephone Company
time some of the equipment in the Tremonton addition
(R. '362-366), the installation of which was nominally
under contract to l\1ax Fonnesbeck but which was totally
subcontracted to Grant Allred and Gene Chiodo ( R.
202-204).

Additional evidence of this practice of payroll
padding and fraud against Bear River Telephone Company was a payment of $354.20 (Ex. 109) to Vincent
Chiodo's 14-year-old granddaughter ( R. 468-470) for
the purported delivery of Bear River Telephone Company directories when, in fact, Don Chiodo handled the
delivery of these directories, in part at least, on regular
company time ( R. 488) .
The facts relating to this specific breach are clearly
established and the law is also clear in permitting an
employer under such circumstances rightfully to terminate the employment of the agent.
This brief could be terminated at this point as to
point II of the argument but there are many additional
breaches of contract by Vincent Chiodo which are material and support the defendant's claim of rightful disl'harge.
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B. Insubordination.

Comment ( b) under section 387 of Restatemen/,
Agency, states:
"b. Scope of duty. The agent's duty is not onlr
to act solely for the benefit of the principal i;t
matters entrusted to him (see §§ 388-392), but
also to take no unfair advantage of his position
in the use of information or things acquired bv
him because of his position as agent or becaus·e
of the opportunities which his position affords.
See §§ 393-398. The agent is also under a dutr
not to act or speak disloyally in matters which
are connected with his employment except in
the protection of his own interests or those of
others. He is not, however, necessarily prevented
from acting in good faith outside his employment
in a manner which injuriously affects his principal's business. His duties of loyalty to the
interests of his principal are the same as those
of a trustee to his beneficiaries. See the Restatement of Trusts, § 170."
Section 385, Restatement, Agency, states:
"Duty to Obey.
(I) Unless otherwise agreed, an agent is sub
ject to a duty to obey all .reasonable directions
in regard to the manner of performing a service
that he has contracted to perform.
( 2) Unless he is privileged to protect his mm
or another's interest, an agent is subject to a duty
not to act in matters entrusted to him on account
of the principal contrary to the directions of
the principal, even though the terms of the cm·
ployment prescribe that such directions shall 11ot
be given."
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'fhe record of this case establishes that Vincent
Chiodo was disobedient, insolent, disrespectful and unfaithful to his employer's interests and that he communicated his insolence and disrespect to employees of
Bear River Telephone Company. As early as January
6, HHH, about two weeks after he sold his Bear River
Telephone Company stock, Vincent Chiodo began making complaints to Mr. A. "'\V. Sanders, the Executive
Yice President of Bear River Telephone Company
(Ex. 22).
In April 1961, Vincent Chiodo was directed to
contact a .Mr. Brough, an insurance agent, and cancel
an insurance policy because the company could effect
a sayings of 32 per cent by use of a blanket policy which
was used to insure affiliated companies (Ex. 30) ..Mr.
Chiodo was told (Ex. 30) :
"I am quite sure that you can properly explain
the Company's position in this matter to Mr.
Brough, and ask that you do so. We are trying
hard to assist you as much as possible on every
day matters at Tremonton. Matters such as this
make me wonder if we are receiving your 100%
co-opera ti on.''
In reply to this directive Vincent Chiodo simply
refused to comply and wrote Mr. Sanders (Ex. 31)
telling Mr. Sanders about Vincent Chiodo's gripes and
finally saying:
"I am returning herewith all papers pertaining to your deal with :Mr. Brough, you can dispose of it as you see fit."
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The policy of insurance in question was a policy
on the properties of Bear River Telephone Companv
and was an ordinary insurance policy which had bee;i
awarded Mr. Brough on the basis of bids submitted to
Bear River Telephone Company by various insurance
companies (Ex. 31).
Rather than follow his orders Vincent Chiodo became rebellious and considered the matter as his personal
business rather than the company's business. In response
to questions concerning this insubordination, Vincent
Chiodo testified as follows ( R. 570) :
"Q And you got along beautifully with l\Ir.
Sanders too?

"A Yes, we did.
"Q Well, in evidence is a letter chastising you
about this Brough insurance matter in April of
1961; isn't that true?

"A The odd thing-yes, that's true.
"Q All right. And isn't it true that you in the
course of that disobeyed a direct order from Mr.
Sanders. He told you to cancel out with Mr.
Brough and you refused to do so and told him
to do it himself?

"A I do not break contracts with any man. He
asked me to break by solemn word, and I won't
do it for anybody.
"Q But you did disobey a direct order from l\lr.
Sanders?

"A If that is an order, I disobeyed it. yes."
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Vincent Chiodo wrote Donald Bell, Sanders' successor, the following concerning Vice President Hansen
(Ex. 29):

"After you read these please destroy them.
I think that the Letter of April 25, 1961 is
enough to hang both Hansen and Anderson.
As I see it however, Anderson was a tool of
Hansen.
"If you have trouble hanging Hansen, let me
know and I'll come out and do the job myself."

rincent Chiodo also wrote .Mr. Sanders about .Mr.
Hansen (Ex. 27) :
"Your attention is directed to the problem of
providing a licensed engineer. As you know Mr.
John Swenson was hired as a temporary operator until VICE PRESIDENT HANSON
had time to make permanent arrangements. Unless provision is made at this time for an orderly
replacement of Mr. Swenson at the time that he
leaves school, the operation of the Microwave at
Promontory will be in jeopardy.
"Please be advised that the Collins microwave
engineerd (sic) by Vice President Hanson is
not performing properly. This matter has been
called to your attention on at least one occasion
previously, but no remedial action has been
taken."
'Vhen inquiry was made by Mr. Cornwell, a staff
officer of the New London off ice, 1 regarding the billing
cif Bear River Telephone Company subscriber, Vincent
! New London was the headquarters for all of the telephone
companies owned by General Waterworks Corporation, including Bear River Telephone Company.
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Chiodo took it upon himself not only to castigate l\Ir.
Cornwell, but to carry his displeasure not to his superior
officer, lVIr. Sanders, but to the president of the com.
pany, Mr. Butcher, who had no function whatever as to
the daily operational problems of Bear River Telephone
Company. In addition, Vincent Chiodo also sent a copy
of his letter to the billing agent of Bear River Telephone
Company in Provo, Utah, who had no bona fide interest
whatever in the internal operations of Bear River Telephone Company. The letter (Ex. 24) states:
"This is in reply to your letter dated 4-1-63
to DHI Computing Service, Provo, Utah. Please
be advised that the contract for DHI was between Vincent Chiodo and Bliss Crandall and
has nothing to do with you. Therefore please stop
bothering Mr. Crandall. . . .
•

"This property was sold to General "\Vaterworks with the provision that I was to manage
it. I intend to run this plant in accordance with
my agreement with Mr. Butcher. In the mean·
time if you have any questions you will contact
me. Under no condition are you to contact my
people."
On numerous occasions Vincent Chiodo would indicate to the Bear River Telephone Company employees
that his superior officers didn't know what they were
doing and were incompetent to manage the Bear River
Telephone Company (R. 316, 425). In June 1963,
Vincent Chiodo told Don Korth that he (Viucent
Chiodo) "should not have to request authority from
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people like him (Dick Hansen) who were incompetent
and not telephone men" (R. 316). He also frequently
directed the Bear River Telephone Company employees
to keep the officers of the company in the dark and not
to send them anything which was not specifically asked
for (R. 319-324, 326, 393-400). He advised the em. ployees that there was going to be a court battle over
his contract as early as six months after the sale (R.
322-324, 326). Vincent Chiodo also told Mr. Sam
'Varner, another employee of Bear River Telephone
Company, in late 1961 or early 1962 that he (Vincent
Chiodo) believed (R. 489) :
"that New London was trying everything
they could to get him to resign from his position
as manager, and that he would not resign regardless of what they did."
He also told .Mr. Warner ( R. 489) "that he would do
everything he could legally to get himself discharged."
This may account for the obvious insolence and disrespect demonstrated continually by Vincent Chiodo in
his correspondence to the head office in New London.
Some of the more obvious of Vincent Chiodo's insubordinations, which are documented, are set forth above.
The full flavor of Vincent Chiodo's disobedience, insolence and disrespect can be better appreciated b~, a
review of all the pertinent exhibits. The exhibits which
are particularly pertinent to this point are numbers
22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36,
42, 43, 44, and 46.
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C. Disclosure of Confidential Information.

Restatement, Agency, Section 395, states as follows:
"Unless otherwise agreed, an agent is subject
to a duty to the principal not to use or to communicate information confidentially given him
by the principal or acquired by him during the
course of or on account of his agency or in violation of his duties as agent, in competition with
or to the injury of the principal, on his own
account or on behalf of another, although such
information does not relate to the transaction
in which he is then employed, unless the information is a matter of general knowledge."
On July 31, 1961, Vincent Chiodo was informed
of pending negotiations with Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph Company for the exchange of the
Bear River Telephone Company properties. Vincent
Chiodo was informed of this matter in his official capacity as manager of Bear River Telephone Company.
Mr. Chiodo in his letter of August 4, 1961, directed to
Mr. Harold F. Clark, Director, Western Area Telephone REA, recognizes that he was instructed to keep
this matter secret. He said (Ex. 23, p. 3):
"Mr. Sanders has asked me not to make this
action public but I can see no reason for not advising you and the commission people."
In direct and flagrant violation of his orders, Vincent Chiodo sent letters to the Public Service Commission of Utah and to the REA. Copies of the letter~
forwarded to the Public Service Commission are Exhibit
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in this case. The absolute refusal of Vincent Chiodo
to follow orders cannot be more manifest than in the
letters sent to the Public Service Commission (Ex. 23).
~:1

In an effort to excuse his disobedience Vincent
Chiodo testified that he felt that he was justified in
making such disclosures because he, Vincent Chiodo,
had sold the company and certain representations were
made as to what General Waterworks Corporation was
going to do. His excuses were as follows ( R. 563-564) :
"Q I'll ask you this. Had you discussed, prior
to the sale, with myself, with R.E.A. and with
the Public Service Commission the purpose-no;
what General 'Vaterworks was going to do so
far as holding this company for operation or
taking it for investment?

"A I had even gone further. I had discussed
in detail practically all of the terms that are in
our August third transcript with all members of
the Utah Public Service Commission, including
engineer Wilford Robinson. I had forwarded
that same information to the chief of the western
area for R.E.A. They had approved of my sale,
as it were, on that basis, and the sale was at that
time interpreted as being to a company that was
going to operate the property and not buying
it for speculation.
"Q And you went to them and told them that
this no longer held good?

"A Yes, I told them I was terribly surprised,
that I had not meant to lie to them originally.
I was taken by surprise.
"Q Now we've got evidence in here where I
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wrote to Mr. Sanders and then Mr. Sanders
wrote back to you upbraiding you for having
discussed it.
"A Yes."
It is clear that Vincent Chiodo was not concerned
about what the company's shareholders and directors
desired for the company, he was only concerned about
himself. The attempt to justify himself by his assumption that the purchase of Bear River Telephone Company by General Waterworks Corporation was approved because of Vincent Chiodo's representations as
to the purpose of General Waterworks Corporation is
patently absurd and merely makes his disobedience more
palpable. His own testimony is conclusive (R. 42):

"Q Why did you go to the Public Service Com·
mission?

"A Why didn't I go"Q Why did you?

"A Well, I was seeking advice on what to do
to look after my own interests in this matter."
(Emphasis added).
It was immediately after this meeting in Denver
that Vincent Chiodo declared war on Bear River Telephone Company and did everything in his power to
cause trouble and problems for the company.

34

D. Disloyalty.

Restatement, Agency, Section 391, states as follows:
"Acting for Adverse Party without Principal's Consent
"Unless otherwise agreed, an agent is subject
to a duty to his principal not to act on behalf
of an adverse party in a transaction connected
with ,,his agency without the principal's knowledge.
Also, Section 394, Restatement, Agency, provides:
"Acting for One with Conflicting Interests
"Unless otherwise agreed, an agent is subject
to a duty not to act or to agree to act during the
period of his agency for persons whose interests
conflict with those of the principal in matters
in which the agent is employed."
During September and October of 1962, Vincent
Chiodo contacted Mr. Elwood A. Crandall of the J. A.
Hogle Company for the purpose of acting as an undisclosed agent of a prospective purchaser of Bear River
Telephone Company from its principal owner, General
Waterworks Corporation. This entire negotiation was
carried out at a time when Vincent Chiodo owed the
highest duty of fidelity and trust to the stockholders of
Bear River Telephone Company as he was both an
officer and director of the Bear River Telephone Company. See, e.g., Elggren v. Wooley, 64 Utah 183, 228
Pac. 906 (1924); Glen Allen Mining Co. v. Pack
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Galena Mining Co., 77 Utah 362, 296 Pac. 231 ( ID31).
Mr. Crandall testified as follows (R. 134) :
"l.VIr. Chiodo said that he believed General
'Vaterworks would sell the company back to him
and that if he could buy it he would in turn sell
it to Independent Telephone. That he would
charge no fee in the process, or markup. He
asked that we not advise General \Vaterworks
that he was acting in this capacity. He suggested
that we contact l\1r. Rampton and work with
him in contacting General Waterworks."

Although Vincent Chiodo's efforts to obtain the
stock of his employer for the benefit of an undisclosed
third party were not successful, it is not the success or
failure which determines the breach but the Yiolation
of the duty of loyalty as stated in Comment on Subsection (1) to Section 409, Restatement, Agency, paragraph (b):
"A wilful disobedience or a violation of duty
of loyalty may constitute a material breaeh o.f
contract although the harm likely to arise frmr.
such breach is very small."
E. Failure to Render Proper Accounts.

Restatement, Agency, Section 382, states as follows:
"Duty to Keep and Render Accounts
"Unless otherwise agreed, an agent is subject
to a duty to keep, and render to his prineipaL
an account of money or other things whieh he
has received or paid out on behalf ()f the principal."
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In violation of his duty to properly account for
funds belonging to Bear River Telephone Company,
Vincent Chiodo deliberately failed to collect proper
charges from customers because of his personal feud
with his superiors in the home office.
Mr. Sam Warner testified that certain charges for
some "watts band service" should have been made to
Thiokol in June 1963. Vincent Chiodo instructed him
that any inquiry on these charges should be referred
directly to Vincent Chiodo and Mr. Warner was to
communicate nothing to the New London office ( R.
439). ,.,.incent Chiodo further instructed 1.\fr. 'Varner,
after seYeral months, to prepare the correct bill so that
New London would not know what was being done
(R. 443):
"Q Now in connection with these offsetting entries, did Mr. Chiodo made (sic) any statement
concerning the way that these two things should
be reported?

"A Yes, he said to make them up on one sheet
or one charge or one credit, whichever way you
would like to put it, that the-he said to put
them on one page so that they wouldn't know
they were being-by 'they' I mean New London-that New London would not know whether
Thiokol was being charged for the additional
services or being given credit for them."

1

In addition, Vincent Chiodo told Mr. 'Varner that
he (Vincent Chiodo) and Warner had no responsibility
to make correct charges because New London could
figure it out themselves ( R. 444) :

37

"A He said that New London had all the figures
that we have, that they received all the papers
from .Mountain States Telephone Companv that
we do, they receive a copy of our reveni.{e di~
tribution, and if they can't figure out that they
are losing or making money from those figure~,
that that was their fault, that it didn't mean
anything to us here."
There were also some charges for advertising in
telephone directories which Yincent Chiodo refused to
bill to Bear River Telephone Company customers. The
failure to make these charges were brought to Yincent
Chiodo's attention on "at least three occasions" (R. 444)
by Mr. 'Varner and Mr. Chiodo told him that it was
not the responsibility of the Tremonton off ice to adYise
the main office. .Mr. \Varner testified that ( R. 445):
"A l\'Ir. Chiodo said that New London had
exactly the same papers that we had, they had
the bill from l\'Iountain States Telephone Company which showed the amount that we were
being charged, they also had our revenue distribution which showed the amount that we were
billing our customers, and that if they couldn't
pick the fact that they were losing money, tlieE
it was not up to us to tell them, that as long as
we were getting our money and doing our "·ork,
he didn't care."
F. Failure to Communicate Information.

Section 381, Restatement, Agency, states:
"Unless otherwise agreed, an agent is s.uhjed
to a dutv to use reasonable efforts to gm" h:s
principal information which is relevant to affair.~
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entrusted to him and which, as the agent has
notice, the principal would desire to have and
which can be communicated without violating a
superior duty to a third person."
Also, Section 383, Restaternent, Agency, states:
"Except when he is privileged to protect his
own or another's interests, an agent is subject
to a duty to the principal not to act in the principal's affairs except in accordance with the
principal's manifestation of consent."
In Comment (e) to Section 383 it states in pertinent

part as follows:

"Acts for which agent is liable. The agent
may be subject to liability to his principal because he has made an unauthorized contract for
which his principal is liable (see sections 159178, 194-202); ... "

In viola ti on of his duty properly to inform his
employer and not to enter into agreements in violation
of law without the consent of Bear River Telephone
Company, Vincent Chiodo did direct two employees
improperly to report overtime work in violation of the
federal \Vage and Hour laws.
By letter of July 22, 1963 (Ex. 35), Vincent Chiodo
represented to Mr. Bell, the Vice President and General
Manager of Bear River Telephone Company, that employees 'Varner and Staples were being paid overtime
to do certain janitorial and automotive repair work. As
a matter of fact these men were not being paid at overtime rates but were in fact being paid less than straight
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time rates . .Further, they were reporting their time al
Vincent Chiodo's direction so that the federal \Vage and
Hours examiners would not be able to detect the false
reporting. .Mr. \Varner testified that Yinceut Chiodo
had given him directions as to how his time was tu he
reported and further testified ( R. 446) :
"A He told me that I was to show hvo hours
on my time sheet for every three hours that J
worked at the janitor job.
"Q Did he say ai1ything further about the rate
of pay or anything of that nature?

"A Nothing more about the rate of pay.
"Q Did he say anything else that you can recall?

"A He said that if anyone should ever question the time that I put on the time sheet for the
janitor's job, that I was to tell no one anything.
that it was strictly between him and myself."
.Mr. Staples also testified that Yincent Chiodo had instructed him as to his time reporting so no questions
would arise with regard to the \Vage and Hour laws
(R. 428):
"Q \Vhat did he (Vincent Chiodo) say!

"A He said I was to report my time so that it
would figure out at two dollars an hour so that
there wouldn't be any question with the hour
and wage law.
"Q \Vhat was your regular rate of pay at tlia1
time?

"A Approximately two-fifty an hour.
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"Q Then how would you report your time, for
example if you spent three hours doing extra
work? How would this appear on your time
record, in addition to an eight hour day?
"A This would show two hours."

III. THE GROUNDS STATED BY THE
TRIAL COURT FOR REFUSING JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF DEFENDANT DESPITE ITS PROOF OF GOOD CAUSE ARE
CONTRARY TO LAW.
After hearing the evidence and receiving voluminous briefs by the parties, the trial court on June 15,
1965, announced its ruling (R. 589, et. seq.) and the
reasons therefor. It is submitted that the ruling based
upon these reasons is in error and the findings of fact
and conclusions of law prepared by counsel for plaintiff
and adopted by the court should be set aside and judgment entered for defendant.
A. The Trial Court Erred in Deciding That The Moral
Standards of the Community Were So Low As To Excuse The
Actions of Vincent Chiodo.

From the District Court's opinion, it is clear that
the court was convinced that the activities of Vincent
Chiodo set forth in the statement of facts and point II
of the argument did in fact occur. The court said (R.
591-592, 596-597) :

"Now the record is quite meager on the surrounding circumstances in the broad sense of
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the word at the time these negotiations 011 the
contract were going on, but the court can't oYerlook the fact-and l guess it's common knowledge; the court will take notice of the proposition that there was a giant rocket facility• beinoM
placed in here on a cost-plus program, which in
the court's view was one of the most wasteful
ways of spending the taxpayers' money that the
court knows anything about. Now it's true in
time of war or stress that cost-plus contracts
are indulged in, but in time of peace when ~
giant cost-plus facility is placed in a conununity
it immediately sets into motion great inflation.
And the only reason, this is material here, gentlemen-I'm not launching on an attack on gorernment policy, but at the time these negotiation.)
were going on it's common knowledge that the
great inflation was taking place in this community. This cost-plus facility out here was
being operated in the great American custom,
and the great American custom calls, of course,
in the court's view, and I'm not picking 011 Thiokol Chemical as against the other, but there's
always padding in these cost-plus deals. arnl
when l\1r. Chiodo took over this company he wtiS
living in these surroundings, and these partie~
must have envisaged moonlight operations, as we
call it, double work contracts and all kinds of
unorthodox employment practices.
"Now as a matter of New Englarnl honesty
the court can't uphold all of these what I call
somewhat minor acts of J\1r. Chiodo, hut considering his surroundings and the inflation and
the padding and the purchase orders and all of
this other business going on around her~. I li,e
court can't convince itself that ~Ir- Chiodo:>
conduct was sufficient to justif~· his disl'hargl'.
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That's all I'm leading up to. I'm not making
any attack on the Thiokol Chemical Company
as such. If there's to be any attack it should be
on the government itself for permitting such
contract practices."

..

.

" ... Now professionally, gentlemen, the court
hangs its hat on three propositions: .First, that
this contract has a-I don't want to use the word
'loophole', but the contract refers to another
agreement and undertaking, and that in the
court's view that's sufficient to permit the court
to look behind the contract. Second, that the
parties by their practical interpretation of the
contract have construed it under the plaintiff's
theory of the case. Now, of course, that's a question of fact. Third, the court finds and concludes
that, while the plaintiff's conduct has certainly
not been lilywhite, considering the Sodom and
Gomorrah community that he was working in
at that time, I'm not going to charge him with
such a serious violation in the light of the surrounding circumstances and surrounding methods of operation so as to justify discharge. Now
I may be wrong; I've been wrong before; but
I'm hangmg my hat on those three propositions."

1

r

There are no decided cases (which have come to
defendant's attention) which would indicate that an
employer cannot rightfully discharge a dishonest employee who permits and participates in payroll padding,
is disobedient of employer's instructions and orders, is
insolent and disrespectful and is unfaithful to his employer's interest because the moral standards of the
community have been depressed to such a point that
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"moonlight operations ... double work contracts a1Hl
all kinds of unorthodox employment practices" ( H. ti0:2
are commonplace giving the community a "Sodom and
Gomorrah" ( R. 596) atmosphere. Aside from the bet
that the law does not condone improper conduct hy an
employee - even though the community practices are
at that low level - there is no evidence in the record
to sustain the District Court's conclusion relative to such
moral standards. If the moral standards of the community are supposed to permit the kinds of actiYities
engaged in by Vincent Chiodo, then it should appear
from witnesses acquainted with such standards and not
by the court's ipse dixit.
1

Section 78-25-1, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, sets
forth those matters as to which a court may take judicial
notice. There is nothing in this statute which would permit a court to take judicial notice of the effect of the
establishment of government defense installations in
Box Elder County on the moral standards of busines~;
men in the area. If the actual status of the comm11niti"s
moral standards is relevant to the ~termination of the
issues of this case, and we submit that it is not, the trial
court should have required plaintiff to offer eYidenec in
support of this excuse for his breaches of contract and
permitted defendant to offer rebuttal evidence. The
court in order to justify its conclusion in this case mmt
have concluded and should have made a finding that the
employment agreement between Bear River Tckph"1w
Company and Chiodo was entered into in light of tlir
claimed low moral standards in the Box E Ider ( \ iw it.'
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community, and that Chiodo was not expected to measure up to any higher standard. To so conclude in the
absence of any evidence on the point is to compound the
~ourt's error.

i

A telephone company is a public utility. Its rates
and standards of service are supervised and regulated
by the Public Service Commission of Utah. It is an
invasion of that Commission's prerogatives for the trial
court to assume that Chiodo and the Bear River Tele, phone Company would contract for a standard of conduct of its manager which would inflate the Company's
costs and affect materially the quality of its services.
If the federal government and its taxpayers were fair
game for the citizens of Box Elder County because of
the government contract with Thiokol as the trial court
apparently assumed, does that mean that the stockholders of Bear River Telephone Company and the
users of the Bear River Telephone Company service
were equally fair game for the local manager of Bear
River Telephone Company?

1

1

The record is clear that the trial court refused to
find justification for the discharge of Vincent Chiodo
because of its belief that the community morals from
1960 to 1963 permitted such conduct and not because
the court had concluded that the various actions claimed
by defendant to have been engaged in by Vincent Chiodo
had not in fact occurred. Defendant specifically re(1uested the court to set forth the facts relative to Vincent
Chiodo's conduct (R. 674-677) but the court merely
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denied defendant's motion and did not make any spcc1hc
finding of fact relative to the actions of \Tincent Cliio:[1,
'l'he effect of this determination is that in the trial court,
opinion it makes no difference \vhether such acts were 11 r
were not engaged in by Vincent Chiodo because, a~ a
matter of law, these acts do not constitute sufficient
justification to permit Bear River Telephone Company
rightfully to discharge Vincent Chiodo. In this the tri;ii
court erred.
B. The Trial Court Erred in Deciding That Bear River
Telephone Company Could Not Rightfully Discharge Vincent
Chiodo Because of The Acceptance of His Activities Over The
Three Year Period.

The trial court in its opinion said ( R. 590-591) :
"There's one other thing that's persuasive to
the court in this matter, and that is the interpretation given by the parties on this exhibit six
during the three years that lVIr. Chiodo operated
this company and the practice of the partirs
lends itself to the proposition that ~Ir. Chio<lu
was to be in practically absolute charge of this
Bear River Telephone Company during this
period of time. It's true that he was depriYed of
the right to sign checks by a resolutio11. bttt that
had nothing to do with the main operation of
the company.
"So the court finds as a fact that the partih
did interpret the contract as indicated 11\ tlic
court by their conduct."
The court by this reference appears to he ti11di1 1g
that while Vincent Chiodo did the things wh1rli dcfrn
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dant claims he did the defendant cannot rightfully discharge him, because by failing to discharge him sooner
the defendant has in effect condoned his actions. The
authorities do not sustain this interpretation and the trial
court erred in its conclusion that by suffering through
three years of intolerable insolent and disrespectful
activity by Vincent Chiodo, Bear River Telephone Company became estopped from doing anything other than
continuing his pay for the balance of the contract period.
The Restaternent, Agency, sets forth several specific duties of an agent, the breach of which will justify
the agent's discharge and the comments on Section 409,
Subsection (2) in paragraph (g) makes it clear that
while a material breach may be condoned to the extent
the employer elects not to discharge the agent for the
breach, such breach will still furnish justification for discharge of the employee for subsequent other breaches
which taken alone would not justify his discharge.
"g. Effect of condonation. If the principal
elects not to discharge the agent for a material
breach of contract, such breach is not of itself
a cause of future discharge. If, however, the
agent commits a subsequent breach of duty too
small in itself to constitute a cause for dismissal,
the prior breach of duty may be considered, so
that, because of the two, the principal may he
privileged to discharge the agent. In no event,
however, does the principal's condonation of
previous conduct by the agent relieve the agent
from liability for damages caused by his breach
of duty, unless the principal has so contracted
or the agent has changed his position in reliance
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upon an agreement with the principal not ti,
take action upon it."
Comments on Section 4<09, Subsection ( 2), paragrapli
(e) of the Restatemenl, Agency, make it clear that !
the principal need not have actual knowledge of the '
agent's breach at the time the agent is discharged 111
order for the discharge to be justified:
"e. Principal's knowledge of breach. If a priucipal has cause for the discharge of an agent and
discharges him, the fact that the principal is 110\
at the time aware that he has cause for discharge
is immaterial. See the Restatement of Contracts.
§ 278. If, under such circumstances, the principal were to compensate the agent for the supposed breach of the employment contract in discharging the agent, the principal would be entitled to restitution. See the Restatement of
Restitution, § 18.

Illustration:
"5. A, who has been employed by P for a
period of one year, is discharged by P on the
alleged ground that A is performing his duties
in an unsatisfactory manner. This is not true:
P is satisfied with A's services. The cause for
discharge is a dimunition in P's business. Cnknown to P, A has embezzled from him. A !ms
no cause of action against P for his <lisclwrge.

"6. Same facts as in Illustration 5, except
that at the time of discharge P paid A $1,0011
to compensate A. P is entitled to reeover l1ack
this amount."
Section 278 of Restatement, Contracts ( rn22). als 11
makes it clear that actual knowledge of a breach al tilt
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time of the discharge is immaterial in order to justify

the discharge:
"Promisor's Ignorance of :Facts That 'Vould
Operate As a Discharge.
"The failure of a condition to exist or to occur
or the actual or prospective failure to perform a
return promise which would prevent a promisor's
duty from arising or would discharge it if he
knew of the facts, has the same effect although
he is ignorant of them."
While the trial court seems to have found that the Hear
River Telephone Company accepted Chiodo's interpretation of the employment agreement as being modified
by the Logan transcript (Ex. I), giving Chiodo considerable latitude in his discretion as manager, there is
nothing in the record to indicate that Bear River Telephone Company interpreted the contract as so modified
to allow Mr. Chiodo to be disloyal, disrespectful or dishonest or condoned such actions.

IV. THE El\.1PLOYMENT AGREEMENT

NOT BE VARIED BY PAROL EVIDENCE; AND EVEN IF SUCH PAROL EVIDENCE IS ADMITTED, THERE IS N0THING IN THE PAROL EVIDENCE OF. FERED 'VHICH \VOULD MAKE THE CONTRACT HERE IN QUESTION A CONTRACT WHICH CANNOT BE TERMIXATED FOR JUST CAUSE.
~IAY

1

In points I to III, supra, it has been assumed,

arguendo, that the employment contract here in question
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could be varied by the parol evidence introduce<l Li
plaintiff relative to the negotiations leading up to tl;t
written contract. It is submitted, however, that the trial
court was correct when it first ruled that parol evidence
could not be introduced to vary this contract (R. J84,
and not, when it later ruled that the contract could he
varied by parol. The court said ( R. 584) :
"THE COURT: '\Tell, if you're going to
assert there's some parol understanding as part
of that written contract - in other words, if
you're going to claim there's an exception to the
parol evidence rule" MR. W ATKISS: I'm not going to brief
you any more on that. I've given it to you.
"THE COURT: 'Vell, you haven't given me
any law on it.
"1.HR. \VATKISS: Yes, I have. My last
brief has maybe four or five cases and restate·
ments and otherwise.
"THE COURT: I'm still not sold now-uow
that we got over the threshold and we've got •t
written contract now, the court is not solrl that
there are any exceptions to the pnrol evidence
rule involved here."
The court apparently changed its mind on this point
because it later said (R. 589) :
"Gentlemen, the plaintiff may prevail in thi~
action. The court feels impelled to state its rea·
sons and to make some discussion in this ca~e.
First of all, looking at the contract between the
defendant, Bear River Telephone, and tl1e plnn1-
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1

tiff, there's a phrase in that contract which in
the court's view permits it to examine into and
scrutinize the prior negotiations and prior agreements between the parties. That's the first phrase
in paragraph three, which reads, 'In accordance
with the understanding and agreement which we
have arrived at.' Then as we all know, the letter
goes on to recite certain specific things. Now it's
this court's view that that phrase is the 'Open
Sesame' that permits this examination, and but
for that perhaps the court couldn't look at or
examine or consider these prior negotiations and
the interview in the Eccles Hotel which was taken
down by the reporter, and the letter, even the
letter of Mr. Sanders, if it was the letter, which
enclosed this letter contract, as well as the telegram. "
If the written agreement cannot be varied by parol
then the law clearly permits Bear River Telephone Company to terminate Chiodo's employment on any one of
the grounds it established; and Bear River Telephone
Company need not assume the additional burden of
proof which it did assume for purposes of the argument
in points I to III.
It is not practical in this brief to explore in depth
the parol evidence rule. The text writers, when discussing this rule, generally hasten to poip.t out that it is
! a rule of substantive law and is not a rule of evidence.
In Section 573 of 3 Corbin on Contracts ( 1960) it
states:

"'Vhen two parties have made a contract and
have expressed it in a writing to which they have
both assented as the complete and accurate in-
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tegration of that contract, evidence, whether
parol or otherwise, of antecedent understa11di 11 ,,1 '
and negotiations will not be admitted for tht
purpose of varying or contradicting the writi 11 ,,.
This is in substance what is called the 'par~I ' .
evidence rule,' a rule that scarcely deserves to
be called a rule of evidence of any kind, and a
rule that is as truly applicable to written eridance as to parol evidence. The use of such a
name for this rule has had unfortunate consequences, principally by distracting the attention
from the real issues that are involved. These
issues may be any one or more of the following:
(I) have the parties made a contract? ( 2) Is
that contract void or voidable because of illegality, fraud, mistake, or any other reason 1 ( :3) Did
the parties assent to a particular writing as the
complete and accurate 'integration' of that contract? "
1

1

It was not contended by Vincent Chiodo that the
parties did not enter into the written employment contract nor that the contract is void or voidable because of
illegality, fraud or mistake. It is difficult to determine
whether Vincent Chiodo contends that the oral comersation of August 3, 1960 (Ex. I) is itself a separate
contract or whether he claims that the contract actual!~·
entered into (Ex. 6) should be amended to include this
transcript. Apparently, the trial court has concluder!
that the employment contract should be amended to in
elude Exhibit 1 as part of the terms of the employment
agreement.

Exhibit 1 may not be considered by the Court for
the purpose of varying or interpreting the agrecmc1ir
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where there is no claim of fraud or mistake of fact in
' the execution of the contract. The Utah Supreme Court
, in Last Chance Ranch Co. v. Erickson, 82 Utah 475,
, 25 P.2d 952, 956, stated:
"The appellant thus first urges that the testimonv of any such oral agreement was received
in vfolation of the parol evidence rule. That the
deed on its face is a completed contract and the
contract and the terms and subject-matter thereof fully and completely stated free from uncertainty or ambiguity is not disputed. No claim
is made of any fraud, misrepresentation, accident, or mistake of fact in the execution of the
deed. The action is not laid nor did it proceed
on any such theory. All that also is true and
admitted as to the written agreement executed
by the parties January 22, 1924, heretofore referred to. The rules of evidence are familiar and
not disputed by the respondent that extrinsic
evidence is not admissible either to contradict
or subtract from, add to or vary, the terms of a
written instrument, and that, in the absence of
accident, fraud, or mistake of fact, the execution
of a contract in writing is deemed to supersede
all of the stipulations concerning its terms or
subject-matter which preceded or accompanied
its execution. IO R.C.L. 1016. Texts and cases
to that effect are cited by the appellant. I Elliott
on Contracts, 19; 2 Elliott on Contracts, 937;
Bartels v. Brain, 13 Utah 162, 44 P. 715; Reese
Howell Co. v. Brown, 48 Utah 142, 158 P.
684."

The reason that evidence of prior negotiations leading up to a contract is not properly admissible as evi' ilence to vary
. the terms of the contract is succinct}y. set
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forth by Ronan E. Degnan in "Parol Evidence - 'i'lit
Utah Version," 5 Utah Law Review 158, rn2 ( 19;Jrj
as follows:
" ... Contracts and other documents are 110 r.
mally if not always preceded by some negotiation
and even perhaps by transaction. But erent.
ually, if concord occurs at all, much of the preliminary agreement and discussion will be abandoned or replaced by a final agreement of the
parties; it is the jural act to which the law at.
tributes changes in legal relationships. In short.
the later agreement supersedes all former. Thus
former negotiations or even agreements are excluded from a trial not because evidence as tu
their existence would be untrustworthy hut be·
cause they are legally immaterial; if their exist·
ence were proved or even admitted it would not
affect the rules of law to be applied in deter·
mining the disposition of the case. This theory
makes the name given the rule a misnomer in·
deed-it states a preference for written over
oral testimony, while the true foundation, according to 'Vigmore, is a preference for subsequent
agreement over prior."
Exhibit l was never intended or considered b)·
either party to the contract to amount to an agreement.
On September 9, 1960, J\fr. Chiodo sent an offer to sell
his stock to .Mr. A. '"· Sanders (Ex. 18). In this offer
J\ir. Chiodo offers to sell if certain terms are agreed to.
One of these terms is that the memorandum of .August
3, 1960 "shall form a part of this agreement." This offer
of Vincent Chiodo was not accepted and on November
4, 1960, a letter from V. F. Rigling (Ex. 5) was sent to
54

\'incent Chiodo. This letter enclosed a copy of the agreement finally entered into but it was stated that:
" ... in the event that such exchange transaction is consummated, and our nominees are
then elected to the board of directors of Bear
River Telephone Company, we will then cause
Bear River Telephone Company to enter into
an employment agreement with you, for a period
of ten years, such agreement to be in the form
attached hereto with such changes therein as may
be agreed to."
These subsequent negotiations evince the fact that
neither party considered the conversation of August 3,
1960 (Ex. 1) to be an agreement between them. Black's
Law Dictionary, Fourth Edition 89, defines an agreement as:
"The act of two or more persons, who unite
in expressing a mutual and common purpose,
with the view of altering their rights and obligations. The union of two or more minds in a
thing done or to be done; a mutual assent to
do a thing."
Effect of Exhibit 1 if it Is Adnii.1Jsihle as Evidence
If the court should determine that Exhibit 1 1s
admissible for all purposes, i.e., that the parol evidence
rule is inapplicable in this case, plaintiff is not benefited.
The only conversation regarding an employment con' tract appears between pages 26 and 29 of Exhibit 1.
111 this conversation Mr. Sanders says that he has been
lerl to believe that Vincent Chiodo cannot be fired under
the employment contract but this is a legal matter that
should be taken up with a lawyer.

1
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.Mr. Sanders was correct in his understanding. 'iiit
only problem was that neither .Mr . .Sanders nor )Ir,
Chiodo considered the possibility that Vincent Chiod(j
might engage in the various activities which the evideu~t
showed he did engage in. So long as Vincent Chiodo <luJ
not violate the conditions of his employment which arr
implied in law, Bear River Telephone Company had iw
legal just cause for discharging him. However, }Ir.
Sanders and Mr. Chiodo did not discuss what woulii
happen if Vincent Chiodo should engage in actiritie1
of the nature disclosed by the evidence. According])·.
Sanders and Chiodo could not have reached an agreement as to what would happen if Vincent Chiodo su
abused his position as manager. In the absence of such
an agreement limiting Bear River's rights to discharge
l\:Ir. Chiodo the general legal rules pertaining to em·
ployment contracts are applicable and Chiodo was boun<l
to meet the standards of integrity of the usual mauager.

'

I

The clear purpose of the conversation betweeu
Chiodo and Sanders reflected in Exhibit I was that
Chiodo having had experience with large corporatio11~
wanted reassurance that he would not be bound hy strict
rules as to standard operating procedures commo11 tn
such organizations. There is not the slightest hint iu the
conservation nor in the other negotiations coneeming
the terms of the employment agreement that Cliiorl 11
was to be allowed to raid the Company treasury at 11 ill ,
to give special benefits to his children or to complcteh
ignore the organizational chain of command of the Bear '
River Telephone Company. He was selling his contr,,J.
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]tug interest. He was being retained as manager. There
is nothing in Exhibit I which would indicate an intent
un the part of General \Vaterworks Corporation as a
prospective purchaser that Chiodo's status as manager
would permit him to expend General 'Vaterworks'
money for the benefit of himself and his family.

I

\'. 'VHEN AN EMPLOYER IS HELD
TO HAVE WRONGFULLY DISCHARGED
AN El\IPLOYEE, THE DAMAGES .MUST
BE REDUCED BY THE A.MOUNT THE
EMPLOYEE CAN EARN OVER THE BALANCE
OF
THE
CONTRACT
TERl\I
THROUGH THE USE OF REASONABLE
DILIGENCE.
Although defendant believes that there was no
wrongful discharge of Vincent Chiodo and that this
court need not consider the question of damages, the
following arguments are included in the event this
conrt should conclude that defendant had no just cause
for the discharge of Vincent Chiodo.
There are two rules for the assessment of damages
which have been followed by various courts. The Utah
, Court has not yet determined which of the rules shall
' be following in this state.
A. Damages May Be Assessed Only to The Date of Trial,
as Future Earnings Cannot Be Known at The Time of Trial.

Some courts have determined that an employee who
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brings an action for wrongful discharge before ti ii
expiration of the employment term may only recorc
damages up to the time of trial. See, e.g., Rohins()n ,
McAlhaney, 6 S.E.2d 517 (N.C. 1940); Mcllfulla 11 ;
Dickinson Co., 62 N.,V. 120 (.Minn. 1895); Corby;
Seventy-One Hundred Jeffery Ave. Bldg. Corp., 1; 11
N.E.2d 236 (Ill. 1945).
1

The basis for this determination is that the employee can only recover for actual damages and sucl 1
damages are the amounts due under the contract less tlit
amount the employee could earn by the exercise ol
reasonable diligence. Because it is not possible to k11m1
in advance what the discharged employee can earn b!
reasonable diligence, the courts which follow this rule
refuse to grant recovery beyond the date of trial.
The facts of the present case provide a good
example of why this rule is a reasonable and fair one.
Yincent Chiodo testified at the trial (R. 45) :
"Q Have you been employed by Bear Rirer
since that date (December 12, 1963) ~

"A No, sir.
"Q Have vou been able to find any other em·
ployment?

"A Not particularly.
"Q 'Vhat have you had?

"A I had four days of work with a firm in XP·
braska and a few days in Canada.
"Q How much have you earned in total in the
time since you were discharged?
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"A Oh, about $500.
"Q How did your expenses of getting that
employment compare with the $500?
"A I think I spent about 800.
"Q In expenses to earn the five?
"A I n expenses, yes. "
Also, on cross examination, Vincent Chiodo testified as
follows ( R. 76-78) :
"Q Now, Mr. Chiodo, you testified yesterday
in connection with your efforts to find other employment since your employment was terminated
with the Bear River Telephone Company in December of 1963. 'Vould you describe just what
you did and what efforts you made?

"A 'Vell, I've met with the Snelling and
Snelling people in an employment service in
Stamford, Connecticut, and I have been referred
or have referred myself to a number of people
such as Service Design Company, Magrath Engineering Company, and for the moment I
think that's it.
"Q I notice you mentioned that you first found
an opportunity or sought an opportunity to sell
your company through advertisements in Telephony, the magazine you referred to.

"A Yes.
"Q Have you looked in Telephony for advertisements to see if there was a place for someone
with your background?

"A Now that you call that to my attention, I
haYe sent in a 'number of resume~ to people in
Telephony Magazine.
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"Q H_ave you made any e~orts t'? find empliiy.
ment m the telephone busmess with an RE.;\
cooperative?
·

"A I'm not sure of that. I'm not sure of that.
"Q By that you mean you have not?

"A I'm not sure whether I have or haven't. I
don't know who the people in the Telephmw
were.
· ·
"MR. RA.MPTON: He didn't know whether
the people he wrote were R.E.A. or not.
"A I can't recall.
"Q Now what other efforts have you made hi
find employment?

"A That's the extent of it.
"Q Have you considered using your experience in the telephone and electronic business as
a contractor or consultant, any of those things!

"A Yes, I have.
"Q Made any effort to do that?

"A Yes.
"Q Where?

"A Oh, I've just been on the lookout for an
opportunity that might arise. In fact, I hare
contacted a firm in-what's the suburb inune·
diately north of Los Angeles, right on the Pa·
cific? Now it's a fair sized suburb.
"MR. RAlVIPTON: Santa l\ilonica.
"A Santa Monica, yes. I have contacted a fir111
in Santa :Monica.
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"Q I take it then that-

" A But no results.
"Q Your interest in finding employment isn't

confined to Tremonton or Box Elder County.
You're willing to go any place?

"A "\Vell, it all depends. It's got to be remunerative enough to pay me to take the loss in Tremonton. I just can't go to work for someone a
thousand miles away and keep doing it at a loss.
"Q I understand that, but you're willing, in
other words, to work anywhere in the United
States you can find suitable employment; is
that correct?

"A Absolutely.

From this testimony, it could only be concluded
that (1) Vincent Chiodo had no knowledge of any available employment, or (2) Vincent Chiodo was not telling
the truth if he did have knowledge of available employment.
The trial of this case was completed on December
18, 1964, and Vincent Chiodo commenced work in
Canada on January 8, 1965, where he was employed
until July 31, 1965 ( R. 661 ) . During the course of this
, employment Vincent Chiodo was paid $4,152.00 (R.
i fi59) plus $7.28 per day for expenses.
Beginning only a few days after the trial, Yin cent
Chiodo actually earned in less than eight months
$4.152.00, even though he had testified under oath that
he had no knowledge of available employment.
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Defendant has never contended that \'ince11t Chiudii
was not technically able as an engineer nor that he \\ai
not capable of performing any job assigned to him. '!'lie
only contentions by defendant have been that Ynicc:ut r
Chiodo for reasons of his own was unfaithful to the e
interest of his employer, the Hear River Telepho11e Com- a
pany, and that as a result of his actions Hear Hirer
Telephone Company had just cause for his discharge,

However, the trial court refused to take into account c
the technical ability and training of Vincent Chiodo a~
an aid in determining what he might earn in the futme
and rendered judgment for the total amount ot' the·
wages to become due under the contract. In def ewlanfs
motion for a new trial ( R. 655) , it was pointed out
that Vincent Chiodo had been employed since short!)·
after the termination of the trial and that knowledge of
the availability of such employment was obviously had
by him at the time of the trial. Despite the fact that it
was known, prior to the judgment becoming final, th:il
Vincent Chiodo had actually been gainfully emplo~·c1L
the trial court still refused to exercise its duty as a fart ,
finder and determine, upon the basis of the known fads.
how much Vincent Chiodo could expect to earn tJuough
the exercise of reasonable diligence over the remaini11g ,
period of the employment contract. This refusal is onh !
consistent with the theory that judgment for darnagl' :
1
to the date of trial is all that can be allowed.
1

If no estimate as to Vincent Chiorlo's future earn·
ings over the balance of the contract is to be made th11·
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, the judgment should only run to the date of trial so that
the employee is not given a windfall profit because of
1
his discharge. Such windfall would arise by virtue of the
t receipt in full of his wages from the past employer plus
c ererything else he could earn from a new employer. The
absence of such a rule would make it more desirable for
r the employee to get fired than to do his best job to render
good and loyal service to the employer and would be
contrarv to the public good.
B. If Damages Are Assessed Beyond the Date of Trial
Then Such Damages Must Be Reduced By The Amount to Be

Earned Over The Balance of The Contract Period Through The
; Exercise of Reasonable Diligence by The Employee.

It is recognized that the majority of courts which
have decided the issue have permitted judgments to be
entered beyond the date of trial where the contract
period extends beyond such date. However, where such
a result is obtained the courts require a determination
of the amount which the employee could earn through
, reasonable diligence. This rule is succinctly stated in
5 Corbin on Contracts, § 1095, p. 515, as follows:
"If at the time of his wrongful discharge the
employee has not substantially completed the
service of a particular period for which a definite
wage installment was the agreed equivalent, the
employer is not yet a contract debtor for the
amount of that wage instalment. The employee
can maintain an action of damages for the
wrongful breach, but he cannot maintain an
action of debt for the agreed wages. The con-
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trary rule was once laid down by the En(rlisii
courts, and it may still be followed in a Mfeii
jurisdictions today. It was held that the eiu
ployee might remain ready and willing to pn .
form the agreed service and at the eud of thl ·
period of service maintain an action of debt fu 1
the agreed wages. This has sometimes beeu re-'·
fered to as the doctrine of constructive seni~e.
The doctrine has been generally abandoned.
however, because of the unnecessary economic'
waste that it involves. In cases of this kind tht
rule concerning avoidable consequences is generally of definite and easy application. The em-\
ployee, instead of remaining idle, is expected !
to get other service of a like character if he ean
do so by making a reasonable amount of effort. !
The damages that he can recover for a wro11gful i c
discharge, therefore, are the total amount of the f
unpaid wages that were promised to him for his
service, less the amount that he can earn br
making reasonable effort to obtain similar sen:· :
ice under another employer. It is not necessar)' I 1
for him to take any serious bodily or financial ·
risks or to accept service of a kind that in itself ·
is distinctly less desirable. It should be ob- '
served that other service is not in itself less de- ,
sirable merely because the wages offered therefor are lower in amount."
1

35 Am. Jur., ~laster and Servant,§ 57, p. 490, states i11

pertinent part:
"
Nor does the mere fact that a wrong
fully discharged employee has not obtained other
employment or has not been paid cumpensab 111
from anv other source necessarilv entitle him to
recover the full contract price o{ his senices for
the unexpired term of his contract with thf' rk
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fendant. It is a well-settled principle that upon
the breach of a contract of employment calling
for personal services by the wrongful discharge
of the employee, the latter is required to use
reasonable efforts to obtain other employment
of like nature for the purpose of lessening or
minimizing the damages. In short, in an action
by a wrongfully discharged employee for the
breach of his contract of employment the defendant employer may reduce the amount of
the damages recoverable by whatever the plaintiff has earned or by reasonable diligence could
have earned in other employment subsequent to
his discharge.

·I

I!

In order to be entitled to reduce the damages
/ claimed, the employer is not required to prove that the
1
, , employee will in fact find employment. The employee
may refuse any and all employment but the damages
1
must still be reduced by the amount which the employee
'
• i would earn by reasonable effort. This rule is stated in
1
! · Section 1095, 5 Corbin on Contracts, p. 518, as follows:
I

I

• I

f

1

i
I

i

"It has frequently been said that the employee
is under a 'duty' to mitigate damages by looking
for other work and accepting it if it can be obtained. Accurately speaking, however, this is not
the case. It makes no difference whatever whether
the employee actually uses the time that is set
free for his use by the employer's discharge or
does not use it. His recoverable damages are
exactly the same in either case. He is legally
privileged to throw away his time if he so desires."

This same rule is stated in different words in the A.L.R .
.\nnotation, 81 A.L.R. 282-283, as follows:
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"It is commonly said that. the rule imv1 1
on a plaintiff the duty of takmg all reasoii:it.
. . . tl ie Joss. 'l'lie use of' the ten
steps to mm1m1ze
'duty' in this connection, while perhaps conn 1,
ent, is loose and inaccurate. There is no eur'
responding right to require the avoidance .',
unnecessary loss; a party is not subject to an :1,
tion for a breach of the so-called duty. Rock:
Vandine ( 1920) 106 Kan. 588, 189 Pac. l.i;
.fl!IcClelland v. Climax Hosiery 1llills (193u
252 N.Y. 357, 169 N.E. 605, concurring opmio:
of Cardozo, Ch. J. what is meant by the suv·,
posed duty is m~rely that, if ,a plaintiff neglect·.\
to do what ordmary and reasonable prudenrc'
dictates to lessen the damages, he will not 11,
heard to say that the loss properly clrnrgeaLl·
to his own neglect is a j ural consequence of tb:
wrong such consequences are deemed not to tl011.
directly and naturally from the wrongful act.I\
and are regarded as remote. It is considereu!
that the will of the plaintiff intenenes at !ht
time the cause of action accrues, and that th.
loss resulting to him thereafter is sufferni
through his own act."
,i
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The trial court refused to make any redudion 11:
the judgment because of the reasonably anticipated
future earnings of Vincent Chiodo (R. 61G) en1;
though, on the motion for a new trial ( R. 655-fi58) it
was admitted by plaintiff that he had been employed
nearly continuously from the date of the trial arnl unl 1i '
after the date of the entry of judgment.

If Vincent Chiodo is entitled to recover 011 bis c11 1•
ployment contract then the law clearly requires the f:ii·i
finder to make a determination of what the emp1°~t·r
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could earn by reasonable effort on his part. The record
is clear that Vincent Chiodo is a trained engineer having
completed the junior year of college (R. 18) with many
r
rears experience in the telephone business. Vincent
" C'hiodo claimed to have built the Bear River Telephone
,
Company from a "high wire outfit" (R. 21) which "was
. bad you hardly would call it a community outfit"
0
.
(R. 21-22) to "the best physical condition of any comL rnunity plant anywhere in the state of Utah" ( R. 23).
p·, Defendant never contested the fact that Vincent Chiodo
1,:: 1rns a capable engineer or could have been a competent
'!
manager.
~
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11

1
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Certainly the trial court had sufficient evidence to
permit it to determine that Vincent Chiodo could, by
reasonable effort, have reduced his damages substautially. This conclusion is substantiated by the facts,
which are a part of the record on the motion for a new
trial, that Vincent Chiodo did in fact earn $4,152.00,
plus expenses, during a period of less than seven months.
If Yincent Chiodo is entitled to recover for breach of
contract then the case should be remanded to the trial
eourt for a determination of the amount which Vincent
Chiodo could earn by making reasonable efforts.

CONCLUSION
The Bear River Telephone Company submits that
the record in this case shows :
I.

The contract between Bear River Telephone
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Company and Vincent Chiodo was an employultiil
agreement for ten years - one of the implied terms (;i
which was that the employee could not be dischargtJ
except for good cause. But equally it implied that tl1t
employee would be a faithful and loyal servant.
'l'he Bear River Telephone Company had good
and sufficient cause for the discharge of Vincent Chiud11
in that:
~.

(a) Vincent Chiodo personally falsified payroll .
records for his son, Don Chiodo, and instructed his sub- · I
ordinate employees to also falisfy payroll records so , I
Don Chiodo could be paid by Bear River 'l'elephom
Company while he was actually employed in Montana ,
by another company. Vincent Chiodo also permitted ,
and condoned other payroll practices permitting im·
proper payments to be made to members of his family. :
He instructed subordinate employees to improperly re·
port their own time and thus subject the compan~· !11 1
liability under the federal wage and hour laws.
(b) Vincent Chiodo wrote letters to his superiors
which were disrespectful and insolent and demonstrated
a general refusal to cooperate with other employees of
Bear River Telephone Company.

1
,

I

I,

(c) Vincent Chiodo actively engaged in a subter·
fuge to obtain the stock of the Bear River Te!ephorw •I
Company from its shareholders for an undisclosed prin
cipal at the same time he was employed as manager :iud
vice-president of Bear River Telephone Company and
had the highest duty of loyalty to the said stockholder
1
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(d) Vincent Chiodo did interfere with plans of the
pru1· cipal stockholder of Bear River Telephone Com. which had been made known to him on a confidenpall)
.
. ..
tial basis by sending letters to the Utah Public Utilities
Commission and the R.E.A. in 'Vashington, D.C.
(e) Vincent Chiodo knowingly permitted his sons
to profit from contracts nominally entered into in the
names of other for work of the Bear River Telephone
Company through the use of Bear River Telephone
• Company employees who were being paid by the Ilea r
' River Telephone Company for their time.
(f) Vincent Chiodo instructed his subordinate em-

ployees to not give the company officers in New London
any information unless it was specifically requested and
I
i prevented the employees from giving their full cooper: ation making the administration of the affairs of Bear
; River Telephone Company more difficult and costly.
3. The most that can be said for the transcript of

ihe conversation between the representative of General

Waterworks Corporation and Chiodo preceding the sale
of the stock and execution of the employment agreement
•is that Chiodo was given some leeway from strict stand: arrl operating procedures in the local management of
the Company. Assuming the conversation was ratified
. by Bear River Telephone Company merely by the
~xecution of the employment agreement, there is nothing
111
such conversation or other evidence of negotiations
loindicate that it was contemplated Chiodo was author. ized to be dishonest, disrespectful, or disloyal. The tov

1
;

1
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management of Bear River Telephone Company in.
dured nearly three years of this type of conduct. Ti,.
fact that its patience reached an end only in Deceml~r,'
1963, should not impose liability for action it could hai I
taken earlier.
·
4. If Bear River Telephone Company did not ha 1,I

just cause for the discharge of Vincent Chiodo, tliti 1
the case should be remanded to the trial court for,:
determination of the amount which Vincent ChiorJ,,l
would, through the exercise of reasonable diligence, ear ,i
~ver the remaining period of th~ contract or reduce tlk\
Judgment to the damages sustamed to the date of triai.
I

1

I

Respectfully submitted,

I

PETER w. BILLINGS
DALE E. ANDERSON

I
!

Fabian & Clendenin
800 Continental Bank Building

Salt Lake City, Utah
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Attorneys for Defendant-Appellmd,
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